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Abstract
We consider a sequential social-learning environment with rational agents and Gaus-
sian private signals, focusing on how the observation network affects the speed of learn-
ing. Agents learn about a binary state and take turns choosing actions based on own
signals and network neighbors’ behavior. The observation network generally presents
an obstruction to the efficient rate of signal aggregation, as agents compromise be-
tween incorporating the signals of the observed neighbors and not over-counting the
confounding signals of the unobserved early movers. We show that on any network,
equilibrium actions are a log-linear function of observations and each agent’s accuracy
admits a signal-counting interpretation. Adding links to the observation network can
harm agents even without introducing new confounds. We then consider a network
structure where agents move in generations and observe some members of the previous
generation. When this observation structure is sufficiently connected and symmetric,
the additional information aggregated by each generation is asymptotically equivalent
to fewer than two independent signals, even when generations are arbitrarily large.
When agents observe all predecessors from the previous generation, social learning ag-
gregates no more than three signals per generation starting from the third generation,
and the long-run learning rate is slower when generations are larger.
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1 Introduction
In many economic environments, information about an unknown state of the world is dis-
persed among a society of agents. As agents take actions based on their private signals and
their observations of social neighbors, the process of social learning gradually aggregates
decentralized information into a group consensus.
How does the underlying social network influence how quickly this aggregation happens?
This question about the speed of social learning carries important welfare implications. Even
if two social networks both lead to the correct group consensus in the long run, agents might
quickly achieve high confidence in the correct state with high probability in one network,
but remain almost fully uncertain about the state for a very long time in the other.
The economic theory literature contains a large body of work on Bayesian models of
sequential social learning, where privately informed agents move in turn and draw rational
inferences from their observations. These papers have largely focused on long-run learning
outcomes, and less is known about how the social network affects the rate of learning. As
Golub and Sadler (2016)’s recent survey points out:
“A significant gap in our knowledge concerns short-run dynamics and rates of
learning in these models. [...] The complexity of Bayesian updating in a network
makes this difficult, but even limited results would offer a valuable contribution
to the literature.”
The present paper investigates the role of the social network on the rate of rational sequential
learning. We avoid some of the “complexity” that Golub and Sadler (2016) mention by
working with a tractable model that allows us to study the speed of rational learning in
different networks but abstracts away from other “obstructions” to efficient learning. We
assume the state is binary and agents have Gaussian private signals about the state. We
also suppose that agents have rich actions, so players infer their neighbors’ beliefs perfectly
through their behavior. This rich-signals, rich-actions world strips away other sources of
learning rate inefficiency1 and isolates the role of the social network.
In general, the observation network generates informational confounds for social learning
even with rich action spaces. Suppose an agent observes the actions of a pair of neighbors
who have both seen the action of an even earlier mover. From the agent’s perspective, this
unobserved early action confounds the informational content of the two neighbors’ behavior,
as the observation network makes it impossible to fully incorporate the two neighbors’ private
information without over-weighting the early mover’s private information. Rational agents
1See the literature review below for papers dealing with how these other mechanisms affect the speed of
learning.
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solve an optimal signal extraction problem to decide how to aggregate their observations
and signals. Networks differ in the severity of such informational confounds, and thus lead
to different rates of Bayesian social learning.
We show that the unique equilibrium of the social-learning game has a log-linear form. We
characterize the equilibrium strategy profile that solves agents’ signal extraction problems
and give a procedure to compute the finite-agent accuracy of social learning. The equilibrium
action of each agent is distributed as if she sees some number of independent private signals.
This signal-equivalence property characterizes action distributions up to a single parameter
measuring the accuracy of beliefs, which simplifies the analysis.
We show that society learns completely in the long run if and only if late enough agents
have arbitrarily long observational paths in the network. As a result, adding links to the
observation network can only (weakly) improve long-run learning outcome. But, the same is
not true for the rate of learning. In a special class of networks without confounding, adding
links speeds up learning and improves every agent’s accuracy. In general, however, agents
can become less accurate in networks with additional links, even when those new links do
not introduce new intransitivities into the network. Extra observations can harm agents,
even without creating any additional confounds.
We then apply our general results to study the speed of learning in the “maximal gener-
ations network” where agents are sequentially arranged into generations of size K, with each
agent in generation t only observing the actions of every predecessor in generation t − 1.
Society learns completely in the long run for every K, but the speed of learning is even-
tually slower with larger K. This implies that when private signals are imprecise, accuracy
thresholds (e.g., the first agent who is at least 90% confident about the true state at least
90% of the time) are achieved earlier in networks with smaller generations. We also show
that no matter the size of the generations, social learning aggregates no more than 3 signals
per generation starting with the third generation, and no more than 2 signals per generation
asymptotically.
Actions are very confounded under the maximal generations network, but in fact the
asymptotic learning rate is bounded uniformly even under more general network structures
that imply less confounding of actions. If agents are arranged into generations of arbitrarily
large size K but observe some subset of their generation t − 1 predecessors, then the same
long-run bound of 2 signals per generations holds whenever the observation structure is
strongly connected, aperiodic, and strongly regular (i.e., all agents observe the same number
of neighbors and all pairs of distinct agents in the same generation share the same number
of neighbors). This result highlights the confounding effect of equilibrium play, as there
exists a feasible (but non-equilibrium) strategy profile that is eventually more accurate than
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aggregating K0 signals per generation for every K0 < K.
1.1 Related Literature
We study rational learning in a sequential model (as first introduced by Banerjee (1992) and
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)) with network observations. Acemoglu, Dahleh,
Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) and Lobel and Sadler (2015) show that in sequential learning
environments similar to our model, rational agents learn the true state asymptotically under
mild conditions on the network. We instead focus on finite-time learning accuracy and the
speed of learning in different networks.
Harel, Mossel, Strack, and Tamuz (2018) study a setting where a fixed group of agents
repeatedly receive signals and choose actions each period, learning from each others’ past
actions.2 Like in our generations network, they find that the rate of learning can be equivalent
to perfectly observing an arbitrarily small fraction of private signals. The mechanism behind
their result, “rational groupthink,” relies on coarse communication — agents have a finite
action space and may get trapped in a wrong consensus for an extended period of time,
because small changes in individual beliefs that do not lead to taking a different action are
unobservable to other group members. In fact, social learning would proceed at the efficient
rate if actions were rich. We highlight a different mechanism for inefficient aggregation of
decentralized information: an observation network that generates informational confounds
can also lead to rates of learning far below the optimum even in a setting with rich actions.
The coarseness of action space serves as the primary obstruction to efficient rate of social
learning in several other papers. Rosenberg and Vieille (2019) consider rational sequential
learning with binary actions and relate properties of the private signal distribution to whether
the speed of learning achieves a particular benchmark. Hann-Caruthers, Martynov, and
Tamuz (2018) compare the rates of learning from past binary actions versus past signals. By
contrast, we study network-based obstructions to achieving the efficient rate of learning and
characterize this rate asymptotically in some examples, by making stronger assumptions on
the informational environment.3
To the best of our knowledge, Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh, and Ozdaglar (2009) is the
only other paper that considers how the rate of rational sequential learning varies with
the observation network. In a binary-actions model, they compare two specific network
structures where each agent has one neighbor: either their immediate predecessor, or a
2When agents receive signals only once but then act repeatedly, Gale and Kariv (2003) show that learning
occurs in finite time. Indeed, the number of periods needed is quite small in several examples.
3Liang and Mu (2019) consider a different obstruction to the efficient rate of learning: myopic agents who
choose from multiple informational sources, unlike our agents who get signals from a fixed distribution.
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random past agent drawn uniformly. We give an expression for the equilibrium accuracy of
every agent on arbitrary fixed networks.
An alternate approach to calculating speed of learning is to consider naive updating
heuristics instead of rational learning, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1993). In the DeGroot
updating model, Golub and Jackson (2012) show that speed of learning is determined by a
simple network statistic that also measures the amount of homophily in the network.
2 Model
There are two equally likely states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}. An infinite sequence of agents
indexed by i ∈ N+ move in order, each acting once. On her turn, agent i observes a private
signal si ∈ R and the actions of her neighbors, N(i) ⊆ {1, ...i− 1}. Agent i then chooses an
action ai ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the expectation of
ui(ai, ω) := −(ai − ω)2
given her belief about ω. So, she will choose the action equal to the probability she assigns
to the event {ω = 1}.
We consider a Gaussian information structure where private signals (si) are conditionally
i.i.d. given the state. We have si ∼ N (1, σ2) when ω = 1 and si ∼ N (−1, σ2) when ω = 0,
where N (a, b2) is the normal distribution with mean a and variance b2, and 0 < 1/σ2 < ∞
is the private signal precision.
Agents’ neighbors are defined by a deterministic network with adjacency matrix M. We
put Mi,j = 1 if j ∈ N(i) and Mi,j = 0 otherwise. The network M is common knowledge.
With the networkM fixed, let ni := |N(i)| denote the number of i’s neighbors. A strategy
for agent i is a function Ai : [0, 1]ni ×R→ [0, 1], where Ai(aj(1), ..., aj(ni), si) specifies i’s play
after observing actions aj(1), ..., aj(ni) from neighbors N(i) = {j(1), ..., j(ni)} and when own
private signal is si.4 Given a profile of strategies (Ai)i∈N+ , observation (aj(1), ..., aj(ni|), si) is
on-path if it has positive density under the profile. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (equilib-
rium for short) is a strategy profile (A∗i )i∈N+ so that for all i and for all on-path observations
of i, A∗i maximizes the Bayesian expected utility given the (well-defined) posterior belief
about ω. We will see that in any equilibrium, si 7→ A∗i (aj(1), ..., aj(ni), si) is a surjective func-
tion onto (0, 1) for all i and aj(1), ..., aj(ni). So an observation is on-path in equilibrium if and
only if all observed actions are interior.
4It is without loss for equilibrium analysis to focus on pure strategies, since agents are never indifferent
between two actions in equilibrium.
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The sequential nature of the social-learning game implies there is a unique equilibrium.
Agent 1 who has no social observations must use the same strategy A∗1(s1) in all equilibria.
So agent 2 also only has one equilibrium strategy A∗2, as the behavior of agent 1 is unique
across all equilibria. Proceeding inductively, there is a unique equilibrium profile (A∗i )i∈N+ .
3 Linearity of Equilibrium and Measure of Accuracy
We will find it convenient to work with the following log-transformations of variables: s˜i :=
ln
(
P[ω=1|si]
P[ω=0|si]
)
, a˜i := ln
(
ai
1−ai
)
. We will call s˜i the log-signal of i and a˜i the log-action of i. These
changes are bijective, so it is without loss to use the log versions. Write A˜∗i (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni), s˜i)
as the (unique) equilibrium map between the log-actions of i’s neighbors and i’s own log-
signal to i’s log-action.
In this section, we show that every A˜∗i is a linear function of its arguments, with coef-
ficients that only depend on the network M (and not on the precision of private signals.)
We also show that there exist constants (ri)i∈N+ with ri ≤ i so that in equilibrium, (ai, ω)
is jointly distributed as-if i chooses ai solely based on ri independent private signals.5 The
constants ri depend on the network and may be interpreted as the number of signals that
social learning on M aggregates by agent i. This gives a convenient language to compare
society’s short-run accuracy on different networks.
In general, the behavior of i’s neighbors are correlated even after conditioning on the
state. Intuitively, i would like to put enough weight on the actions of her neighbors to
incorporate their private signals, but doing so carries the risk of over-counting the signals
of earlier agents observed by several members of N(i) but not by i. The social network
M thus creates an informational confound that generally prevents i from fully extracting
the signals of N(i). The equilibrium strategy of i represents the optimal aggregation of her
neighbors’ actions. The next result shows the optimal aggregation is linear and gives an
explicit expression for the coefficients. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. For each agent i with N(i) = {j(1), ..., j(ni)}, there exist constants (βi,j(k))nik=1
so that
A˜∗i (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni), s˜i) = s˜i +
ni∑
k=1
βi,j(k)a˜j(k).
The vector of coefficients ~βi,· is given by
~βi,· = 2
(
E[(a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni)) | ω = 1] ·Cov[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni) | ω = 1]−1
)
.
5The constants ri need not be integers, and we will formalize the meaning this claim for non-integer ri
in Definition 1.
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For general private signal distributions, models of Bayesian updating in networks have
tractability issues, as Golub and Sadler (2016) point out. The key lemma to proving Propo-
sition 1 is the following property of the Gaussian information structure in our model, which
ensures that i’s observations have a jointly Gaussian distribution conditional on ω. This
permits us to study optimal inference in closed form.
Lemma 1. For each i, s˜i has a Gaussian distribution conditional on ω, with E[s˜i | ω = 0] =
−2/σ2, E[s˜i | ω = 1] = 2/σ2, and Var[s˜i | ω = 0] = Var[s˜i | ω = 1] = 4/σ2.
Proposition 1 implies that we may find weights (wi,j)i≥j so that the realizations of equi-
librium log-actions are related to the realizations of log-signals by a˜i =
∑i
j=1wi,j s˜j. Let W
be the matrix containing all such weights. The next result relates ~βi,· and W and shows that
both are independent of the private signal precision.
Proposition 2. Let Wˆ be the submatrix of W with rows N(i) and columns {1, ..., i−1}.Then
~βi,· = ~1
′
(i−1) ·Wˆ ′(WˆWˆ ′)−1 and the i-th row of W is Wi =
(
(~β′i,· · Wˆ ), 1, 0, 0, ...
)
. In particular,
neither W nor ~βi,· depends on σ2.
Proposition 2 provides an inductive procedure to compute the coefficients in the unique
equilibrium profile and the matrix W. We start with the first row of W, W1 = (1, 0, 0, ...).
Proposition 2 gives an expression for the equilibrium coefficients ~β2,· of agent 2 and the
weight she puts on different log-signals, W2. This in turn lets us calculate the coefficients
and log-signal weights for agent 3, ~β3,· and W3, and so forth. Equilibrium behavior and log-
signal weights depend on the neighborhoods defined by the network M, but not on private
signal precision.
We would like to evaluate networks in terms of their short-run social-learning accuracy,
so as to compare the rates of Bayesian learning on different networks. Towards a measure
of accuracy, imagine that agent i observes n ∈ N+ independent private signals, but gets
no other information about ω. Then, the Bayesian i would play the log-action equal to
the sum of the n log-signals, so by Lemma 1 her behavior would follow the distributions
a˜i ∼ N
(
±n · 2
σ2 , n · 4σ2
)
, with the positive and negative means conditional on ω = 1 and
ω = 0 respectively. Our concept of the speed of learning exploits the fact that on any
network, the equilibrium log-action distribution of every agent must follow a generalized
version of this distribution with a possibly non-integer n.
Definition 1. Social learning aggregates r ∈ R+ signals by agent i if the equilibrium log-
action a˜i has the conditional distributions N
(
±r · 2
σ2 , r · 4σ2
)
in the two states.
When agents use a non-equilibrium strategy profile, the conditional distributions of a˜i
need not equal N
(
±r · 2
σ2 , r · 4σ2
)
for any r. Indeed, if this profile results in i putting weights
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(wi,j)j≤i on log-signals (s˜j)j≤i, then a˜i has conditional distributions of the desired form if
and only if ∑ij=1wi,j = ∑ij=1w2i,j.
But as the next result shows, the equilibrium log-actions always admit this kind of signal-
counting interpretation.
Proposition 3. There exist (ri)i∈N+ so that social learning aggregates ri signals by agent i.
Here (ri)i∈N depend on the network M, but not on private signal precision.
It is clear that we must have ri =
∑i
j=1wi,j where wi,j is the equilibrium weight that i
puts on s˜j. Since the matrix of weights W is independent of σ2 by Proposition 2, we can
use (ri)i∈N+ as a measure of how the network M affects the speed of rational information
aggregation in our social-learning setting.
Before turning to results about finite-time accuracy, we develop two equivalent necessary
and sufficient conditions for long-run learning in our setting. We say society learns completely
in the long run if (ai) converges to ω in probability. For a given networkM, write PL(i) ∈ N
to refer to the length of the longest path inM originating from i (this length is 0 ifN(i) = ∅).
Proposition 4. The following are equivalent: (1) lim
i→∞PL(i) =∞; (2) limi→∞
[
maxj∈N(i) j
]
=
∞; (3) society learns completely in the long run.
Condition (1) of Proposition 4 says society learns completely in the long run if and only
late enough agents have arbitrarily long observational paths. In fact, the proof of the result
shows ri ≥ PL(i) + 1 in all networks. Condition (2) is the analog of Acemoglu, Dahleh,
Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011)’s expanding observations property for a deterministic network.
It says if we consider the most recent neighbor observed by each agent, then this sequence of
most recent neighbors tends to infinity. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011) show
that expanding observations is necessary and sufficient for long-run learning in a random-
networks model with rich signals and binary actions. With continuous actions, the same
result is a consequence of Proposition 3.
The conditions that guarantee long-run learning are mild. The remainder of the paper
studies the speed of learning by comparing (ri)i∈N+ on different networks.
Agent j belongs to the set of indirect neighbors of n, N¯(n) ⊆ {1, ..., n− 1}, if there exists
a path of any length from n to j in the observation network. The next proposition studies
the uniform lower-bound on rn across all network structures, as a function of the size of n’s
indirect neighborhood. We show that an agent with arbitrarily many indirect neighbors must
aggregate at least 5 signals in the limit. This bound is tight in that we exhibit a sequence
of networks where |N¯(n)| = n− 1 yet rn < 5 for every n ∈ N.
Proposition 5. Let Mn be the set of all networks where N¯(n) = {1, ..., n − 1}, rn(M) =
E[a˜n | ω = 1] on network M, and f(n) := minM∈Mn rn(M). Then limn→∞ f(n) = 5.
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Figure 1: A network structure achieving the lower-bound on n’s accuracy based on the size
of her indirect neighborhood. For every n, rn < 5.
On a network M where agent n has n′ < n− 1 indirect neighbors, we may apply Propo-
sition 5 to the subnetwork given by the indirect neighborhood of n. This shows that on
M, rn ≥ f(n′). So in any network, agents with large enough indirect neighborhoods must
aggregate at least close to 5 signals.
The proof of Proposition 5 makes use of the following example, which can be thought
of the “worst” network for agent n in that it achieves the asymptotic lower-bound of signal
aggregation as n→∞.
Example 1. In the network in Figure 1, agent n puts weight 1
n−1 on each of a˜2, ..., a˜n−1 in
equilibrium, thus social learning aggregates rn = 4 · n−2n−1 + 1 signals by agent n. We have
rn < 5 for all n.
4 When Does Adding Links Improve Accuracy?
For two observation networksM andM•, writeM• ≥M ifM• can be generated fromM by
adding links, that is M•j,k ≥Mj,k for all j, k. By Proposition 4, adding links leads to weakly
better asymptotic learning outcomes — if the conditions for complete long-run learning are
satisfied forM, then the same holds forM•. But, when does adding links improve finite-time
accuracy?
We show that agent i is more accurate on networkM• than on networkM if both networks
are transitive at i: that is, whenever j ∈ N(i) and k ∈ N(j), we have k ∈ N(i). We also
highlight that intransitivities — that is, sequences of links in → in−1, in−1 → in−2, ..., i2 → i1
such that in 6→ i1 — form a key obstacle to obtaining higher accuracy on denser networks.
Accuracy may decrease for some agents if the new links create new intransitivities. Further,
accuracy may decrease even in the absence of new intransitivities, if the baseline network M
already contains intransitivities.
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Figure 2: The black links define a transitive networkM with n agents. For k ∈ {2, ..., n−1},
adding the k − 1 red links from agents 2, ..., k to agent 1 creates a new network M•k that is
no longer transitive for agent n. For k ≥ 5, agent n has strictly lower accuracy on M• than
M.
Proposition 6. Suppose M• ≥ M and both networks are transitive at i. Then ri is weakly
higher on M• than on M.
The proof of Proposition 6 shows that for any network that is transitive at i, Wi,j = 1 for
j ∈ N¯(i)∪ {i} and Wi,j = 0 otherwise — that is, i perfectly incorporates the private signals
of all agents she indirectly observes. That is, ri is equal to the number of agents indirectly
observed by i. The denser network M• improves i’s accuracy because it expands i’s indirect
neighborhood.
We show by example that the same conclusion does not hold if M• generates new intran-
sitivities relative to M.
Example 2. Consider the networks M,M•2 , ...,M•n−1 in Figure 2.
In network M, agent n perfectly incorporates the private signals of neighbors 2, ..., n− 1
and social learning aggregates rn = n − 1 signals. In network M•k for 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, the
additional links expand n’s indirect neighborhood, but also create informational confounds
through intransitivities. In the new network, n cannot disentangle the private signals of her
neighbors from the unobserved signal s1 that serves as a common influence for her neighbors’
behavior.
In the equilibrium on network M•k , n puts weight 2k on the log-actions of 2, ..., k, thus
social learning aggregates r(k)n = 4 · k−1k + n− k signals by agent n. We have that r(2)n > rn,
so the first red link helps and allows n to incorporate all private signals. But r(k)n is strictly
decreasing in k. In particular, r(k)n is strictly smaller than rn whenever k ≥ 5. Adding four
or more red links to the original network M strictly harms n’s welfare.
Suppose the baseline network M already contains some intransitivities. The next exam-
ples shows that adding links may decrease some agent’s accuracy even if the new links do
9
Figure 3: Adding the new link in red does not create new intransitivities, but nevertheless
decreases agent 9’s accuracy.
not create new intransitivities. In particular, links can harm agents without creating any
new confounds simply by changing the weights on existing confounds.
Example 3. Consider the networks M and M• in Figure 3.
Intransitivities exist both in the old network M defined by the black links, and in the
new network M• that adds the one red link. Even though the newly added link does not
generate any additional intransitivities, we have r9 = 3681533 ≈ 6.91 in the old network and
r9 = 1977287 ≈ 6.89 in the new network, so socially learning aggregates fewer signals by agent
9 in M•.
Agent 9 becomes less accurate in M• because agent 6’s new link causes her to change
her equilibrium play in a way that generates negative informational externality for agent 9.
In both M and M•, agent 6 cannot fully incorporate the private signals of agents 4 and 5
without over-counting the private signals of agents 1 and 2. In network M, agent 6 puts
weight 47 on the log-actions of agents 4 and 5, thus weight
8
7 on s˜1 and s˜2. In network M
•,
agent 6 puts a higher weight 35 on the log-actions of agents 4 and 5, because she can now
subtract off part of the informational confound using her observation of agent 3. This change
in her equilibrium strategy means her over-weighting of s˜1 and s˜2 is exacerbated, with these
log-signals each receiving weight 65 . At the same time, s˜1 and s˜2 also confound agent 9’s
inference about the private signals of agents 7 and 8. Agent 9 finds it harder to incorporate
agent 6’s private signal in M•, because a˜6 now contains a more severe over-counting of s˜1
and s˜2. The change in agent 6’s play on M• does not taken into account the welfare of agent
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9, who has a different signal extraction problem that involves worse confounding by s˜1 and
s˜2.
5 Rate of Learning in the Generations Network
As an application of Section 3’s general results, we study the speed of rational learning
in the generations network. Agents are sequentially arranged into generations of size K.
Agents in the first generation (i.e., i = 1, ..., K) have no neighbors. A collection of inter-
generational observation sets, Ψk ⊆ {1, ..., K} for k = 1, ..., K define the network M for
agents in later generations. For i = (t − 1)K + k where t ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, network M
has N(i) = {(t− 2)K + ψ : ψ ∈ Ψk}. So the k-th agent of generation t ≥ 2 observes agents
in Ψk from generation t− 1 (and no agents from any earlier generations).6
5.1 Maximal Observations and the Role of Generation Size
We first focus on the maximal generations network where Ψk = {1, ..., K} for all k, so agents
in generation t for t ≥ 2 have all agents in generation t − 1 as their neighbors.7 The next
result relates the generation size K to the speed of signal aggregation.
Proposition 7. In the maximal generations network with any K ≥ 1, society learns com-
pletely in the long run. With larger K, social learning aggregates fewer signals per agent
asymptotically: ri = i · (2K−1)K2 + o(i).
Note (2K−1)
K2 is decreasing in K for K ≥ 1. That is, even though society eventually learns
the true state with any K, the asymptotic rate of learning is higher with smaller K. Indeed, if
K = 1, then every agent perfectly incorporates all past private signals and the speed of social
learning is the highest possible. Not only does this comparison about the rate of learning
hold asymptotically, but it also holds numerically for all agents i ≥ 16 when comparing
among K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, as shown in Figure 4.
How many signals does social learning aggregate per generation? The proof of Proposition
4 shows ri ≥ PL(i) + 1 in all networks and thus provides a lower bound of 1: each agent i
in generation t has PL(i) = t− 1. The next corollary shows this lower bound is not too far
6Stolarczyk, Bhardwaj, Bassler, Ma, and Josić (2017) study a related model where only the first generation
observes private signals. Their main results characterize when no information gets lost between generations,
i.e., social learning is completely efficient.
7This network is similar to the “multi-file” treatment in the laboratory experiment of Eyster, Rabin, and
Weizsacker (2018), except agents only observe the actions of the immediate past generation, not those of
all previous generations. In the multi-file treatment, unlike in the maximal generations network, Bayesian
agents can perfectly infer the private signals of all previous movers in equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Number of signals aggregated by social learning in generations networks with
different numbers of agents per generation, K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
from the actual learning rate. No matter how large K is, social learning aggregates fewer
than 2 signals per generation asymptotically. There is also a short-run version of this result:
starting with generation 3, fewer than 3 signals are aggregated per generation for any K.
Corollary 1. In the maximal generations network with any K, social learning aggregates
fewer than 2 signals per generation asymptotically. In fact, for any K and any agent i in
generation t ≥ 3, ri ≤ K + 3t− 5.
Suppose we are interested in a “confidence threshold” metric of learning efficiency — for
instance, how many agents does it take to become at least 90% confident in the true state
more than 90% of the time? The next corollary shows that societies with smaller generations
reach any such threshold earlier when private signals are imprecise.
Corollary 2. For every 0.5 < a¯ < 1, 0 < p¯ < 1, and every pair of generation sizes K1 < K2,
there exists a bound τ > 0 on signal precision such that whenever 0 < 1/σ2 < τ , the earliest
i such that P[ai > a¯ | ω = 1] > p¯ is smaller with K1 agents per generation than with K2
agents per generation in the maximal generations network.
Finally, we show that later agents put drastically different weights on the private signals
from the first generation and the private signals from the immediate predecessor generation
in forming their beliefs about ω. We emphasize that this asymmetric weighting arises in the
equilibrium of a Bayesian model where agents engage in optimal signal extraction and make
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rational inferences about the state. Intuitively, this is because the informational confounds
present in the maximal generations network lead to over-counting the earliest movers’ signals
even for rational players.
Corollary 3. The total weight that generation t puts on the log-signals of generation 1
satisfies ∑Kj=1w(t−1)K+1,j → ∞ as t → ∞, while the total weight that generation t puts on
the log-signals of generation t− 1 satisfies ∑(t−1)Kj=(t−2)K+1w(t−1)K+1,j → 1 as t→∞.
5.2 Partial Observations and a General Learning-Rate Bound
Corollary 1 shows that social learning aggregates fewer than 2 signals per generation asymp-
totically on maximal generations networks with any K. We now prove that the same bound
holds for a broad class of generations networks with more general inter-generational obser-
vational sets.
We introduce three assumptions on (Ψk)k.
The observation sets (Ψk)k are strongly connected if for every 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ K, there
exist t1, t2 so that t1K + k1 is connected to t2K + k2 in M. This rules out the case where
the k2-th agent in every generation is always excluded from the indirect neighborhood of the
k1-th agent of every future generation.
The observation sets (Ψk)k are aperiodic if the induced graph on {1, ..., K} given by
k1 → k2 if and only if k2 ∈ Ψk1 is aperiodic, i.e., no integer larger than 1 divides the length
of every cycle. This is a common condition that would be satisfied, for example, if k ∈ Ψk
for each k.
The observation sets are strongly regular if all agents observe d neighbors and all pairs
of agents in the same generation share d′ common neighbors, i.e. |N(i)| = d for all i > K
and |N(i1)∩N(i2)| = d′ whenever i1 = (t− 1)K + k1 and i2 = (t− 1)K + k2 for some t ≥ 2
and 1 ≤ k1 < k2 ≤ K distinct. This adapts the usual notion of strongly regular networks to
our directed networks with the generations structure.
Strongly regular observation sets include the maximal generations network and the net-
work in which agents k in generation t observes all agents except agent k in generation t−1,
i.e., Ψk = {1, ..., K}\ {k}. There also exists a strongly regular network with K = 6 agents
with degrees d = 3 and pairwise intersections d′ = 2, for example.
Theorem 1. Suppose (Φk)k is strongly connected, aperiodic, and strongly regular. Then
lim supi(ri/i) ≤ 2/K.
Theorem 1 shows that on a more general class of generations networks, social learning
aggregates no more than two signals per generation in the long run. The slow rate of learning
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depends on each agent acting myopically and is not an inherent limitation of the genera-
tions structure. To illustrate this point, we show there exist feasible (but non-equilibrium)
strategies so that agents are asymptotically more accurate than aggregating K0 signals per
generation for every K0 < K.
We introduce a new measure of accuracy. Agent n’s action is more accurate than r signals
if P[an > 0.5 | ω = 1] > P[Ar > 0.5 | ω = 1] and P[an < 0.5 | ω = 0] > P[Ar < 0.5 | ω = 0],
where the log transform of Ar has conditional distributions A˜r ∼ N (±r · 2σ2 , r · 4σ2 ) in the
two states. That is, n’s action is more likely to lean towards the correct state than the
action of someone who observes r independent signals. While this definition applies even
for non-equilibrium strategies that do not lead to a˜n having the conditional distributions
N (±rn · 2σ2 , rn · 4σ2 ), if some such rn existed then the definition would be equivalent to rn > r.
Proposition 8. Suppose the observation sets (Ψk)k are strongly connected and aperiodic.
There is a strategy profile such that, for every positive real number K0 < K, there exists a
corresponding T so that for all t ≥ T and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the action of agent (t − 1)K + k is
more accurate than (t− 1)K0 signals.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We show that s˜i = 2σ2 si. This is because
s˜i = ln
(
P[ω = 1|si]
P[ω = 0|si]
)
= ln
(
P[si|ω = 1]
P[si|ω = 0]
)
= ln
exp
(−(si−1)2
2σ2
)
exp
(−(si+1)2
2σ2
)

= −(s
2
i − 2si + 1) + (s2i + 2si + 1)
2σ2 =
2
σ2
si.
The result then follows from scaling the conditional distributions of si, (si | ω = 1) ∼
N (1, σ2) and (si | ω = 0) ∼ N (−1, σ2).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Agent 1 does not observe any predecessors, so clearly A˜∗1(s˜1) = s˜1. Suppose by way of
induction that the equilibrium strategies of all agents j ≤ I − 1 are linear. Then each a˜j for
j ≤ I − 1 is a linear combination of (s˜`)I`=1, which by Lemma 1 are conditionally Gaussian
with conditional means ±2/σ2 in states ω = 1 and ω = 0 and conditional variance 4/σ2
in each state. This implies (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI)) have a conditional joint Gaussian distribution
with (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI)) ∼ N (~µ,Σ) conditional on ω = 1, and t (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI)) ∼ N (−~µ,Σ)
conditional on ω = 0, where ~µ = E[(a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni))′ | ω = 1] and Σ = Cov[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni) |
ω = 1].
From the the multivariate Gaussian density, (writing (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI))′ = ~a),
ln
(
P[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI) | ω = 1]
P[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI) | ω = 0]
)
= ln
(
exp(−12(~a− ~µ)′Σ−1(~a− ~µ))
exp(−12(~a+ ~µ)′Σ−1(~a+ ~µ))
)
= ~a′Σ−1~µ+ ~µ′Σ−1~a
which is 2 (~µ′Σ−1) · (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(nI))′ because Σ is symmetric. This then shows agent I’s
equilibrium strategy must also be linear, completing the inductive step. This argument also
gives the explicit form of ~βI,·.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose N(i) = {j(1), ..., j(ni)} with j(1) < ... < j(ni). By Lemma 1 and con-
struction of Wˆ , we have E[a˜j(k) | ω = 1] = 2σ2
∑i−1
`=1 Wˆk,`. So, E[(a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni)) | ω =
1] = 2
σ2 (Wˆ · 1(i−1))′ = 2σ21′(i−1)Wˆ ′. Also, again by Lemma 1 and construction of Wˆ , we
can calculate that for 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ ni, Cov[a˜j(k1), a˜j(k2) | ω = 1] = 4σ2
∑i−1
`=1(Wˆk1,`Wˆk2,`),
meaning Cov[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni) | ω = 1] = 4σ2 WˆWˆ ′. It then follows from Proposition 1 that
~βi,· = 2 · 2σ21′(i−1)Wˆ ′ ·
[
4
σ2 WˆWˆ
′
]−1
= ~1′(i−1) · Wˆ ′(WˆWˆ ′)−1.
Since i puts weight 1 on s˜i and weights ~βi,· on (a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni))′ = Wˆ · (s˜1, ..., s˜i−1)′, this
shows the first i− 1 elements in the row Wi must be ~β′i,· · Wˆ while the i-th element is 1.
For the last claim, W1 = (1, 0, 0, ...) does not depend on σ2. The same applies to ~β1,·. By
way of induction, suppose rows Wi and vectors ~βi,· do not depend on σ2 for any i ≤ I. If Wˆ
is the submatrix of W with rows N(I + 1), then since N(I + 1) ⊆ {1, ..., I}, by the inductive
hypothesis Wˆ must be independent of σ2. Thus the same independence also applies to ~βI+1,·
since this vector only depends on Wˆ by the result just derived. In turn, since WI+1 is only
a function of ~β′I+1,· and Wˆ , and these terms are independent of σ2 as argued before, same
goes for WI+1, completing the inductive step.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It suffices to show that E[a˜i | ω = 1] = 12Var [a˜i | ω = 1]. By Proposition 1, a˜i =
s˜i+
∑ni
k=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k). From Lemma 1, we have E[s˜i | ω = 1] = 12Var [s˜i | ω = 1]. Furthermore,
s˜i is independent from
∑ni
k=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k), as the latter term only depends on s˜1, ..., s˜i−1. So we
need only show E[∑nik=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k) | ω = 1] = 12Var [∑nik=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k) | ω = 1]
Let ~µ = E[(a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni))′ | ω = 1] and Σ = Cov[a˜j(1), ..., a˜j(ni) | ω = 1]. Using the
expression for ~βi,· from Proposition 1, E
[∑ni
k=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k) | ω = 1
]
= 2 (~µ′Σ−1) · ~µ. Also,
Var
[
ni∑
k=1
βi,j(k)a˜j(k) | ω = 1
]
=
(
2~µ′Σ−1
)
· Σ ·
(
2~µ′Σ−1
)′
= 4~µ′Σ−1~µ
using the fact that Σ is a symmetric matrix. This is twice E
[∑ni
k=1 βi,j(k)a˜j(k) | ω = 1
]
as
desired.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We first state and prove an auxiliary lemma.
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Lemma 2. For any 0 <  < 0.5,
P[ai > 1−  | ω = 1] = 1− Φ
 ln
(
1−

)
− ri 2σ2√
ri
2
σ
 ,
where Φ is the standard Gaussian distribution function. This expression is increasing in ri
and approaches 1. Also,
P[ai <  | ω = 0] = Φ
 ln
(
1−

)
+ ri 2σ2√
ri
2
σ
 .
This expression is increasing in ri and approaches 1.
Proof. Note that ai > 1 −  if and only if a˜i > ln
(
1−

)
> 0. Given that (a˜i | ω = 1) ∼
N
(
ri · 2σ2 , ri · 4σ2
)
by Proposition 3, the expression for P[ai > 1 −  | ω = 1] follows. To see
that it is increasing in ri, observe that ddri
ln( 1− )−ri 2σ2√
ri
2
σ
has the same sign as
−2
σ2
(√ri 2
σ2
)− (ln
(1− 

)
− ri 2
σ2
)(12r
−0.5
i
2
σ
) = − 2
σ3
√
ri − ln
(1− 

)
r−0.5i
1
σ
< 0.
Also, it is clear that limri→∞
ln( 1− )−ri 2σ2√
ri
2
σ
= −∞, hence limri→∞ P[ai > 1 −  | ω = 1] = 1.
The results for P[ai <  | ω = 0] follow from analogous arguments.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. By Proposition 3, there exist (ri)i∈N+ so that social learning aggregates ri signals
by agent i. We first show that society learns completely in the long run if and only if
limi→∞ ri = ∞. Let ′ > 0 be given and suppose limi→∞ ri = ∞. Putting  = min(′ , 0.4),
we get that P[|ai − ω| <  | ω = 1] → 1 and P[|ai − ω| <  | ω = 0] → 1 since the two
expressions in Lemma 2 increase in ri and approach 1, hence also P[|ai − ω| < ′ ] → 1. So
society learns completely in the long run. Conversely, if ri < K < ∞ for infinitely many i,
then by Lemma 2 we will get that P[|ai−ω| < 0.1 | ω = 1] are bounded by 1−Φ
(
ln(9)−K 2
σ2√
K 2
σ
)
for these i, hence society does not learn completely in the long run.
Next, we show that Conditions (1) and (2) in the proposition are both necessary and
sufficient conditions for limi→∞ ri =∞.
Condition (1): limi→∞ PL(i) =∞.
Necessity: Suppose limi→∞ ri = ∞. For ` ∈ N, let I(`) := {i : PL(i) = `}. We show
by induction that I(`) is finite for all ` ∈ N. For every i ∈ I(0), ri = 1, so limi→∞ ri = ∞
implies |I(0)| < ∞. Now suppose |I(`)| < ∞ for all ` ≤ L. If i ∈ I(L + 1), then every j
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that can be reached along M from i must belong to I(`) for some ` ≤ L. The subnetwork
containing i is therefore a subset of ∪L`=0I(`), a finite set by the inductive hypothesis. Thus
ri ≤ 1+∑L`=0 |I(`)| for all i ∈ I(L+1). So limi→∞ ri =∞ implies I(L+1) is finite, completing
the inductive step and proving I(`) is finite for all `. Hence limi→∞ PL(i) =∞.
Sufficiency: First note if j ∈ N(i), then ri ≥ rj + 1. This is because in equilibrium,
a˜j ∼ N
(
±rj · 2σ2 , rj · 4σ2
)
conditional on the two states, and furthermore a˜j is conditionally
independent of si. So, a˜j + s˜i is a possibly play for i, which would have the conditional
distributions N
(
±(rj + 1) · 2σ2 , (rj + 1) · 4σ2
)
in the two states. If ri < rj + 1, then i would
have a profitable deviation by choosing a˜i = a˜j + s˜i instead, since it follows from Lemma 2
that a log-action that aggregates more signals leads to higher expected payoffs.
Condition (2): limi→∞
[
maxj∈N(i) j
]
=∞.
Necessity: If Condition (2) is violated, there exists some j¯ < ∞ so that there exist
infinitely many i’s with N(i) ⊆ {1, ..., j¯}. The subnetwork containing any such i is a subset
of {1, ..., j¯}, so ri ≤ j¯ + 1. We cannot have limi→∞ ri =∞.
Sufficiency: Construct an increasing sequence C1 ≤ C2 ≤ ... as follows. Condition
(2) implies there exists C1 so that maxj∈N(i) j ≥ 1 for all i ≥ C1. So, PL(i) ≥ 1 for all
i ≥ C1. Suppose C1 ≤ ... ≤ Cn are constructed with the property that PL(i) ≥ k for all
i ≥ Ck, k = 1, ..., n. Condition (2) implies there exists Cn+1 so that maxj∈N(i) j ≥ Cn for all
i ≥ Cn+1. But since all j ≥ Cn have PL(j) ≥ n by the inductive hypothesis, all i ≥ Cn+1
must have PL(i) ≥ n + 1, completing the inductive step. This shows limi→∞ PL(i) = ∞.
By the sufficiency of Condition (1) for limi→∞ ri =∞, we see that Condition (2) implies the
same.
A.6 Proof of Example 1
Proof. We apply Proposition 2 to calculate ~βn,· in this network. The submatrix Wˆ of W
with rows {2, ..., n− 1} and columns {1, ..., n− 1} is
Wˆ =

1 1 0 0 . . .
1 0 1 0 . . .
1 0 0 1 . . .
... ... ... ... . . .
 .
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So we get
(WˆWˆ ′)−1 =

2 1 1 . . .
1 2 1 . . .
1 1 1 . . .
... ... ... . . .

−1
= In−2 − 1
n− 1Onesn−2
where In−2 is the (n − 2) × (n − 2) identity matrix and Onesn−2 is the (n − 2) × (n − 2)
matrix of all 1’s. So,
Wˆ ′(WˆWˆ ′)−1 = Wˆ ′ − 1
n− 1Wˆ
′ ·Onesn−2
=

1 1 1 . . .
1 0 0 . . .
0 1 0 . . .
0 0 1 . . .
... ... ... . . .

− 1
n− 1

n− 2 n− 2 n− 2 . . .
1 1 1 . . .
1 1 1 . . .
... ... ... . . .

where the dimension of each matrix is (n−1)×(n−2). The sum of each column is 2− 2n−4
n−1 =
2
n−1 , which is ~βn,j for j = 2, ..., n−1. From here it is easy to calculate that rn = 4· n−2n−1 +1.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. By the proof of Example 1, f(n) < 5 for all n. It suffices to show that lim infn f(n) ≥ 5.
We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In any network, suppose |N¯(i)| ≥ 4. Then ri ≥ 4.
Proof. Suppose ri < 4. For any agent j, we have rj ≥ 3 if there are paths from agent j to
at least two other agents. Therefore, for any agent j observed by agent i, there must be a
path from j to at most one other agent, i.e., rj ∈ {1, 2}.
First, suppose that rj = 1 for all agents observed by i. Since i then observes at least four
agents with empty neighborhoods, ri ≥ 5.
Next, suppose that rj = 2 for one agent observed by i. Then rj = 1 for at least two
agents observed by i, so ri ≥ 5.
Finally, suppose that rj = 2 for at least two agents observed by i. Consider any two such
agents. Neither of these agents can observe the other, because then one would have rj ≥ 2.
If these two agents observe distinct neighbors, then ri ≥ 5. Therefore, all agents with rj = 2
must observe the same neighbor. If there are at least three such agents, the computation in
the upper bound shows that ri ≥ 4. Else, agent i observes one agent with rj = 1 and two
20
agents with rj = 2 who observe the same neighbor. Then ri ≥ 5 as well, which completes
the lemma.
Now we return to the proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that for some  > 0, there is an
increasing sequence of positive integers (bn)n∈N with f(bn) ≤ 5−  for all n. For each n ∈ N,
choose a network Mn with |N¯(bn)| = bn − 1 and rbn(Mn) ≤ 5− . If bn observes some agent
i with |N¯(i)| ≥ 4, then by Lemma 3, we would have ri ≥ 4 and therefore rbn ≥ 5. Thus, for
any agent i ∈ N(bn), we have |N¯(i)| ≤ 3. An immediate consequence is that the number of
agents observed by agent bn in Mn must converge to ∞ as n→∞.
Because there are finitely many networks with four agents, there are finitely many possible
values of ri for agents i ∈ N(bn). By the pigeonhole principle, there exists some r∗ and an
infinite subsequence of the networks (Mn)n∈N, so that the number of agents i ∈ N(bn) with
ri = r∗ in Mn converges to ∞ with n along the subsequence.
If r∗ = 1, we have a contradiction since this shows rbn(Mn) > 5 for large n, since bn
observes an unbounded number of agents who have no social observations.
Now assume r∗ ≥ 2, which is the next smallest possible value. Identify (bn)n∈N, (Mn)n∈N
with the subsequence and d(n) is the number of agents i ∈ N(bn) with ri = r∗ in Mn.
We show that in each network Mn, it is feasible for bn to construct an estimate from the
log-actions of those agents i with ri = r∗ and her own log-signal, which is at least as
informative as five independent signals about the state. This leads to a contradiction as it
shows rn(Mn) ≥ 5 for large n.
First consider the case where any two i 6= j ∈ N(bn) with ri = rj = r∗ have Cov[a˜i, a˜j |
ω = 1] = (r∗ − 1) 4
σ2 . Suppose bn places weight w on each of these agents and weight one on
her private signal. Then the conditional mean of her action is (w · r∗ · d(n) + 1) · 2
σ2 and the
conditional variance is
4
σ2
(
w2d(n)2r∗ − w2d(n)(d(n)− 1) + 1
)
.
These differ by a factor of 2 when
w = r
∗
d(n)r∗ − d(n) + 1 .
Thus this estimate has the same joint distribution with the state as (r∗)2d(n)
d(n)r∗−d(n)+1 + 1 in-
dependent private signals, showing that rbn ≥ (r
∗)2d(n)
d(n)r∗−d(n)+1 + 1. Since d(n) → ∞, this
shows lim infn rbn(Mn) ≥ (r
∗)2
r∗−1 + 1 ≥ 5 since r∗ ≥ 2. This contradicts the hypothesis that
rbn(Mn) ≤ 5−  for all n.
Now we drop the assumption that Cov[a˜i, a˜j | ω = 1] = (r∗ − 1) 4σ2 for all i 6= j ∈ N(bn)
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with ri = rj = r∗. The conditional variance of the sum placing weight 1 on own signal and
any weight w > 0 on the d(n) neighbors is
4
σ2
+
d(n)∑
i=1
w2r∗
4
σ2
+ 2
∑
1≤i<j≤d(n)
w2Cov(a˜i, a˜j).
It is strictly increasing in each Cov(a˜i, a˜j) term. So if all i, j pairs have conditional covariance
of larger than (r∗ − 1) · 4
σ2 , the estimate constructed above will have the same conditional
mean and smaller conditional variance than (r∗)2d(n)
d(n)r∗−d(n)+1 + 1 independent private signals,
which again implies rbn ≥ (r
∗)2d(n)
d(n)r∗−d(n)+1 + 1.
Finally, we show that for two agents i 6= j with ri = rj = r∗, Cov(a˜i, a˜j) ≤ (r∗ − 1) · 4σ2 .
We have ∑k wi,k = ∑k wj,k = r∗. Also, i cannot be in j’s indirect neighborhood and vice
versa, else we cannot get ri = rj as every agent is strictly more accurate than any agent in
their indirect neighborhood. Thus we have wi,i = 1, wi,j = 0, wj,i = 0, wj,j = 1. So
Cov(a˜i, a˜j) = Cov(s˜i +
∑
k 6=i,j
wi,ks˜k, s˜j +
∑
k 6=i,j
wj,ks˜k)
= 4
σ2
∑
k 6=i,j
wi,kwj,k.
By the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, (∑k 6=i,j wi,kwj,k)2 ≤ (∑k 6=i,j w2i,k)·(∑k 6=i,j w2j,k). By Propo-
sition 3, ∑k 6=i,j w2i,k = ∑k 6=i,j w2j,k = r∗ − 1, thus ∑k 6=i,j wi,kwj,k ≤ r∗ − 1.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We first show that on any network transitive at i, the equilibrium strategy of i is such
that a˜i =
∑
j∈N¯(i)∪{i} s˜j. Clearly, a˜i cannot put any weight on the log-signals of agents not
in N¯(i) ∪ {i}, for information outside of the sub-network containing i cannot reach i. Also,
if feasible, ∑j∈N¯(i)∪{i} s˜j is the optimal signal aggregation for i. For every j ∈ N¯(i), we have
N(j) ⊆ N(i). Since i knows j’s linear equilibrium strategy A˜∗j((a˜k)k∈N(j), s˜j), i can identify
s˜j by calculating a˜j −∑k∈N(j) βj,ka˜k. Therefore i can identify the sum ∑j∈N¯(i) s˜j using her
neighbors’ actions.
Combined with Proposition 3, this shows ri on any network transitive at i is equal to
the cardinality of N¯(i) plus one. Agent i must have a larger indirect neighborhood on M• if
M• ≥M .
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A.9 Proof of Example 2
Proof. In the equilibrium on networkM•k , agent n puts weight 1 on each of a˜k+1, ..., a˜n−1 and
the same weights on a˜2, ..., a˜k as in Example 1 when n = k + 1. From the proof of Example
1, this weight is 2
k
.
We have r(2)n = n > rn, while ddk (4
k−1
k
+ n − k) = 4
k2 − 1 < 0 for k > 2. This shows r(k)n
is strictly decreasing in k for k ≥ 2. Finally, rn − r(k)n = k2 − 5k + 4 is a convex quadratic
function with zeroes at 1 and 4. So rn = r(4)n while rn > r(k)n for all k ≥ 5.
A.10 Proof of Example 3
Proof. For the network where agent 6 does not observe agent 3, by Proposition 2 we find
~β6,· = ~1
′
(5) ·

1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
0 1

·

 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1
 ·

1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
0 1


−1
=
 47
4
7
 .
Then, letting
Wˆ :=

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8
7
8
7
8
7
4
7
4
7 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
we get
~β9,· = ~1
′
(8) · Wˆ ′(WˆWˆ ′)−1 = ~1
′
(8) · Wˆ ′ ·
1
533

853 −280 128 128
−280 245 −112 −112
128 −112 371 −162
128 −112 −162 371
 =
1
533

61
413
131
131
 ,
and hence we can calculate the 9th row of W and r9.
For the network where agent 6 observes agent 3, note that agent 6 can recover s˜1 + s˜2 + s˜4
and s˜1 + s˜2 + s˜5 using a˜4 − a˜3 and a˜5 − a˜3. Thus, the weights that agent 6 puts on a˜4 and
a˜5 are the same as in a network where agents 4 and 5 only observe agent 2. This can be
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computed by Proposition 2:
~1′(5) ·

1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
0 1

·

 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
 ·

1 1
1 1
0 0
1 0
0 1


−1
=
 35
3
5
 ,
which shows ~β6,· = (−15 , 35 , 35)′. Then, letting
Wˆ :=

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
6
5
6
5 1
3
5
3
5 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
we get
~β9,· = ~1
′
(8) · Wˆ ′(WˆWˆ ′)−1 = ~1
′
(8) · Wˆ ′ ·
1
287

412 −125 60 60
−125 125 −60 −60
60 −60 201 −86
60 −60 −86 201
 =
1
287

72
215
69
69
 ,
and hence we can calculate the 9th row of W and r9.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 7
We first prove a lemma that expresses ~βi,· in closed-form for an agent i in generation t + 1.
Let a˜sum be the sum of the log-actions played in generation t − 1 in equilibrium. By the
linearity of equilibrium (Proposition 1), there must exist some µsum, σ2sum > 0 so that the
conditional distributions of a˜sum in the two states are N (±µsum, σ2sum).
Lemma 4. Each element in ~βi,· is
(
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
/
(
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
.
Proof. An application of Proposition 1 shows each agent j in generation t aggregates a˜sum
and own private signal s˜j according to a˜j = 2 · µsumσ2sum a˜sum + s˜j.
Next, consider the problem of someone in generation t + 1 who observes the log-actions
a˜j of the K agents j = (t− 1)K + k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K from generation t. By symmetry, i places
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the same weight on these K log-actions in equilibrium. To find this weight, we calculate
E
[
K∑
k=1
a˜(t−1)K+k | ω = 1
]
= 2Kµ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 2K 1
σ2
Var
[
K∑
k=1
a˜(t−1)K+k | ω = 1
]
= K ·
(
4 · µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 4 · 1
σ2
)
+K · (K − 1) · 4 · µ
2
sum
σ2sum
So by Proposition 1,
βi,j =
2 ·
(
2K µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 2K 1
σ2
)
K ·
(
4 · µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 4 · 1
σ2
)
+K · (K − 1) · 4 · µ2sum
σ2sum
=
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
for every j = (t− 1)K + k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, as desired.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. Regardless ofK, for each agent i in generation t, PL(i) = t−1, so limi→∞ PL(i) =∞.
By 4, society learns completely in the long run.
Consider an agent i in generation t + 1. From Proposition 3, there must exist xnew > 0
so that a˜i ∼ N (±xnew, 2xnew) conditional on the two states. Using the formula for ~βi,· from
Lemma 4, we have
xnew =
2K(µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2 )
2
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
+ 2
σ2
.
By contrast, the action of each agent in generation t is distributed as N (±xold, 2xold) where
xold = 2 · µ2sumσ2sum +
2
σ2 . We have
xnew − xold =
(4K − 2)µ2sum
σ2sum
1
σ2 + 2K
1
σ4
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
.
Since limi→∞ ri =∞, µsumσsum must grow without bound in generations. In late enough genera-
tions, xnew − xold is therefore well-approximated by 2 (2K−1)K 1σ2 . Since there are K agents per
generation, we in fact have a˜i ∼ N (±ri · 2σ2 , ri · 4σ2 ) where ri = i · (2K−1)K2 + o(i) as desired.
A.12 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The first claim just comes from Proposition 7 and observing (2K−1)
K2 ·K = (2K−1)/K <
2.
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Suppose the conditional log-action distributions in generations t+1 and t areN (±xnew, 2xnew)
and N (±xold, 2xold).
A hypothetical agent who observes a˜sum (the sum of log-actions in generation t) with
conditional distributions N (±µsum, σ2sum)and three independent private signals would play a
log-action with conditional distributions N (±y, 2y) where
y =
[
2µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 6
σ2
]
+ 2
σ2
.
To show that y ≥ xnew, we have[
2µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 6
σ2
]
·
[
K
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
]
− 2K(µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)2
=(2 + 6K) · µ
2
sum
σ2sum
· 1
σ2
+ 6
σ4
− 4K · µ
2
sum
σ2sum
· 1
σ2
− 2K 1
σ4
≥2K 1
σ2
(
µ2sum
σ2sum
− 1
σ2
)
.
We must have P[a˜sum > 0 | ω = 1] ≥ P[s˜1 > 0 | ω = 1], a probability that just depends
on the ratio of the mean and standard deviation. So µsum
σsum
≥ 1
σ
, i.e. µ2sum
σ2sum
≥ 1
σ2 . Hence the
difference above is positive. This shows xnew−xold ≤ 3· 2σ2 . Note also that in generation 2, all
log-actions from generation 1 are independent, hence µsum = 2K/σ2 and σ2sum = 4K/σ2. This
shows agents in generation 3 have log-actions conditionally distributed as N (m3, 2m3) where
m3 ≤ (K+ 4) · 2σ2 . And so in general, the equilibrium log-actions of each agent in generation
t ≥ 3 has the conditional distributions N (±mt, 2mt) where mt ≤ (K + 3t− 5) 2σ2 .
A.13 Proof of Corollary 2
Let a¯ > 0.5, p¯ > 0 be given.
Let r(K1)i , r
(K2)
i denote the number of signals aggregated by social learning by agent i in
the maximal generations networks with K1 or K2 agents per generation, respectively. Both
(r(K1)i ) and (r
(K2)
i ) are increasing, unbounded sequences and Proposition 7 implies there
exists some I so that r(K1)i > r
(K2)
i for all i ≥ I. Note that by Proposition 7, this I does not
depend on the private signal variance σ2.
Choose τ near enough to 0 so that 1 − Φ
 ˜¯a−rK1I 2σ2√
r
K1
I
2
σ
 < p¯ whenever 0 < 1/σ2 < τ . By
Lemma 2, this ensures that for all i ≤ I, P[ai > a¯ | ω = 1] < p¯ in both networks provided
1/σ2 < τ . For i > I, if P[ai > a¯ | ω = 1] > p¯ with K2 agents per generation, then by
r
(K1)
i > r
(K2)
i , we also have the same condition satisfied with K1 agents per generation, again
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by Lemma 2. Thus the earliest i where this condition holds occurs after i = I and occurs
earlier with K1 agents per generation.
A.14 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. That ∑(t−1)Kj=(t−2)K+1w(t−1)K+1,j → 1 as t→∞ just comes from observing that this sum
of weights is equal to the sum of entries in ~β(t−1)K+1,·, which isK ·
(
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
/
(
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
by Lemma 4. As in the proof of Proposition 7, µsum
σsum
must grow without bound with genera-
tions, so K ·
(
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
/
(
K µ
2
sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
)
→ 1.
Let w¯T,t = w(T−1)K+1,(t−1)K+1, the weight that each agent in generation T puts on the log-
signal of each agent in generation t ≤ T . Let β¯t be the weight that each agent in generation
t puts on each log-action in generation t− 1.
We have
w¯T,t = KT−t−1 ·
T−t∏
j=1
βT−j+1
for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. This is because we may imagine a weighted network where each agent in
generation t is connected to each agent in generation t−1 with a link of weight β¯t, and w¯T,t is
the number of weighted paths between an agent in generation T and an agent in generation
t.
Let Gt = r(t−1)K+1, the number of signals that social learning aggregates by generation
t. Consider all previous generations t < T and all K predecessors in generation t, we have
GT = 1 +
∑T−1
t=1 K · w¯T,t. Therefore
GT+1 −GT = K · w¯T+1,T +
T−1∑
t=1
(Kw¯T+1,t −Kw¯T,t)
= KβT+1 + (KβT+1 − 1)
T−1∑
t=1
(Kw¯T,t)
Since each βt is of the form
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
K
µ2sum
σ2sum
+ 1
σ2
, we have Kβt > 1 for all t, hence w¯T,t is positive and
decreasing in t. So GT+1−GT ≤ KβT+1 +(T−1) ·(Kw¯T+1,1 −Kw¯T,1). For large T, Corollary
1 implies GT+1 − GT ≈ 2K−1K and KβT+1 ≈ 1, so (Kw¯T+1,1 −Kw¯T,1) ≥ 1T−1(2K−1K − 1) for
large T. This shows Kw¯T,1 →∞ as T →∞ by comparison to the harmonic series.
A.15 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We can assume that d > 1, because else there is no social learning (d = 0) or exactly
one signal is aggregated per generation so ri/K → 1 (d = 1).
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We claim that for each generation t and each i, i′ in generation t, Var [a˜i | ω = 1] and
Cov [a˜i, a˜i′ | ω = 1] depend only on t and not on the identities of i or i′, which we call Vart
and Covt, respectively. Similarly, for i in generation t and each j ∈ N(i), the weight βi,j
depends only on t, which we call βt.
The claims hold by inductively applying the strong regularity condition. Clearly they are
true for t = 2. Suppose they are true for all t ≤ T . For an agent i in generation t = T + 1,
the inductive hypothesis implies Var[a˜j | ω = 1] is the same for all j ∈ N(i),E[a˜j | ω = 1]
is the same for all j ∈ N(i) (by using Proposition 3, and all pairs j, j ′ ∈ N(i) with j 6= j ′
have the same conditional covariance. Thus by Proposition 1, i places the same weight, say
βt, on all neighbors. So we have
Var[a˜i | ω = 1] = 4
σ2
+ β2t (dVart−1 + (d2 − d)Covt−1)
for all i in generation t, and
Cov[a˜i, a˜i′ | ω = 1] = β2t (d′Vart−1 + (d2 − d′)Covt−1)
for all agents i 6= i′ in generation t. This shows the claims for t = T + 1.
Taking the difference of the two expressions for Vart and Cov gives:
Vart −Covt = 4
σ2
+ β2t (d− d′)(Vart−1 −Covt−1). (1)
We now require an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5. βt → 1/d.
Proof. By Proposition 3, we can compute that:
βt+1 =
Vart
Vart + (d− 1)Covt ≥
1
d
.
It is therefore sufficient to show that Vart/Covt → 1. The weight wi,i′ that an agent i
in generation t places on the private signal of an agent i′ in generation t− τ is equal to the
product of ∏τj=1 βt+1−j and the number of paths from i to i′ in the network M.
We can compute the number of paths as follows. Consider a Markov chain with states
{1, . . . , K} and state transition probabilities P[k1 → k2] = 1/d if k2 ∈ Φk1 , P[k1 → k2] = 0.
The number of paths from i in generation t to j in generation t− τ is equal to dτ times the
probability that the state is j after τ periods.
Because (Φk)k is strongly connected, and aperiodic, this Markov chain is irreducible
and aperiodic. By standard results (see e.g., Billingsley (2013)), there exists a stationary
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distribution pi∗ ∈ RK++ with
∑K
k=1 pi
∗
k = 1 of the Markov chain. Given  > 0, we can choose
τ0 such that the number of paths from i in generation t to j = (τ − 1)K + k in generation τ
is in [dτ (pi∗k − ), dτ (pi∗k + )] for all t and all τ ≥ τ0.
Fixing distinct agents i and i′ in generation t:
Vart =
4
σ2
+ 4
σ2
t−1∑
τ=1
K∑
k=1
w2i,(t−τ)K+k and Covt =
4
σ2
t−1∑
τ=1
K∑
k=1
wi,(t−τ)K+kwi′ ,(t−τ)K+k.
We want to show that
Vart/Covt =
1 +∑t−1τ=1∑Kk=1w2i,(t−τ)K+k∑t−1
τ=1
∑K
k=1wi,(t−τ)K+kwi′ ,(t−τ)K+k
→ 1.
Take  > 0 smaller than pi∗k for all k. For τ ≥ τ0, we have
wi,(t−τ)K+kwi′ ,(t−τ)K+k ≥ (dτ
τ∏
j=1
βt+1−j)2(pi∗k − )2 and w2i,(t−τ)K+k ≤ (dτ
τ∏
j=1
βt+1−j)2(pi∗k + )2
The covariance grows at least linearly in t since each β ≥ 1/d, while the contribution from
periods t− τ0 + 1, . . . , t is bounded and therefore lower order. Thus,
lim sup
t→∞
Vart/Covt ≤ lim sup
t→∞
∑K
k=1
∑t−1
τ=τ0(dτ
∏τ
j=1 βt+1−j)2(pi∗k + )2∑K
k=1
∑t−1
τ=τ0(dτ
∏τ
j=1 βt+1−j)2(pi∗k − )2
≤ max
1≤k≤K
(pi∗k + )2
(pi∗k − )2
.
Since  is arbitrary, this completes the proof of the lemma.
We return to the proof of Theorem 1. Fix small  > 0. By Lemma 5, we can choose T
such that βt ≤ 1+d for all t ≥ T . Therefore, β2t (d − d′) ≤ (1+)
2
d
for t ≥ T . Consider the
contraction map ϕ(x) = 4
σ2 +
(1+)2
d
x. Iterating Equation (1) starting with t = T , we find
that Vart −Covt ≤ ϕ(t−T )(VarT −CovT ), so this shows
lim sup
t→∞
(Vart −Covt) ≤ 4
σ2
· d
d− (1 + )2
where the RHS is the fixed point of ϕ. Since this holds for all small  > 0,we get lim supt→∞(Vart−
Covt) ≤ 4σ2 dd−1 .
Using Proposition 3, we have Vart+1 = 2(βt+1d(Vart/2) + 2/σ2), so
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Vart+1 −Vart = (βt+1d− 1)Vart + 4
σ2
= ( dVartVart + (d− 1)Covt − 1)Vart +
4
σ2
= ( dVart
dVart − (d− 1)(Vart −Covt) − 1)Vart +
4
σ2
→ ( dVart
dVart − 4σ2 · (d− 1) · dd−(1+)2
− 1)Vart + 4
σ2
.
Using lim supt→∞(Vart −Covt) ≤ 4σ2 dd−1 , we conclude
lim sup
t→∞
(Vart+1 −Vart) ≤ lim
t→∞
(
Vart
Vart − 4σ2
− 1
)
Vart +
4
σ2
.
Since Vart → ∞, we get limt→∞
(
Vart
Vart− 4
σ2
− 1
)
Vart = 4σ2 using Taylor expansion. So
lim supt→∞ (Vart+1 −Vart) ≤ 8σ2 , implying lim supi ri/i ≤ 2/K.
A.16 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Consider a Markov process with states {1, ..., K} and state transition probabilities
P[k1 → k2] = 1/|Ψk1| if k2 ∈ Ψk1 , P[k1 → k2] = 0 otherwise. (Each Ψk is non-empty, since
the observation sets are strongly connected.) This process is irreducible and aperiodic. By
standard results (see e.g., Billingsley (2013)), there exists a stationary distribution pi∗ ∈ RK++
with ∑Kk=1 pi∗k = 1, such that limτ→∞(MΨ)τ~ek = pi∗ for every 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where ~ek ∈ RK is a
vector with 1 in position k and 0 in other positions, and MΨ is the stochastic matrix for the
Markov process.
For t ≥ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, abbreviate agent i = (t− 1)K + k as [t, k]. Consider the strategy
profile where agent [1, k] puts weight 1/pi∗k on her log-signal, while agent [t, k] for t ≥ 2 puts
weight 1/|Ψk| on each observed log-action and weight 1/pi∗k on her log-signal. The weight
that [t, k] puts on the log-signal of [t′ , k′ ] for t′ < t is (1/pi∗
k′ ) · ((MΨ)t−t
′
~ek)k′ . Noting this
quantity only depends on the difference t− t′ and on k, k′ , we abbreviate it as ct−t′ ,k,k′ and
observe that maxk,k′ |cτ,k,k′ − 1| → 0 as τ →∞, since limτ→∞(MΨ)τ~ek = pi∗ for every k.
We show that under this strategy profile, a˜i with i = [t, k] has the conditional distribu-
tions N (±((t− 1)K + o(i)) 2
σ2 , ((t− 1)K + o(i)) 4σ2 ). Let  > 0 be given and we show for all
large enough i = [t, k], |E[a˜i | ω = 1]/(2/σ2) − ((t − 1)K)| < i. This is because there is T
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so that maxk,k′ |cτ,k,k′ − 1| < /4 for all τ ≥ T, which shows
|E[a˜i | ω = 1]/(2/σ2)− ((t− 1)K)| ≤ (/4)(t− 1− T )K + max
k,k′ ,τ<T
|cτ,k,k′ − 1| · (TK) + 1/pi∗k.
Because there are finitely many values of cτ,k,k′ with τ < T , the maximum maxk,k′ ,τ<T |cτ,k,k′−
1| is constant in i. Thus the bound is a constant term in i plus a term no larger than (/4) · i.
By similar reasoning,
|Var[a˜i | ω = 1]/(4/σ2)−((t−1)K)| ≤ (/2+2/16)(t−1−T )K+ max
k,k′ ,τ<T
|c2τ,k,k′−1|·(TK)+(1/pi∗k)2.
The bound is a constant term in i plus a term no larger than (2/3) · i for  near 0.
Let K0 < K be given. If A˜ has the conditional distributions N (±(t − 1)K0 · 2σ2 , (t −
1)K0 · 4σ2 ) in the two states, then P[A > 12 | ω = 1] = Φ(
√
(t− 1)K0/σ). Pick some
 > 0 so that K−√
K+ >
√
K0. There corresponds T so that for for i = [t, k] with t ≥ T and
1 ≤ k ≤ K, E[a˜i | ω = 1] ≥ (t − 1)(K − ) 2σ2 and Var[a˜i | ω = 1] ≤ (t − 1)(K + ) 4σ2 , so
P[ai > 12 | ω = 1] ≥ Φ(
√
(t− 1) · (K − )/(√K + σ)), so i is more accurate than (t− 1)K0
signals.
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